In a simple model of social interaction I analyze the welfare effects of positive (prescriptive) and negative (proscriptive) social norms, together with the private incentives for their enactment. I find that imposing no law is socially optimal when individual actions have no significant externalities, while bans become socially optimal as the externalities increase. Prescriptions are generally the worst choice, except when the externalities involved are very high. However, in the political arena support is rarely won for non intervention or for a ban, since an alternative majority will generally be found in favor of some prescription. This remains true even when strategic voting is considered, and provides an argument for the idea that a liberal state cannot be liberally enforced by rational voters.
Introduction
People stay together because they can benefit from mutual interaction. Of course, they can also suffer from these interactions. However, what is important for the analysis conducted below is that, living in societies, they can hardly avoid interacting with each other. No matter how we behave, we affect other people's well being, and others affect us.
Given interaction, people have always tried to act in such a way to condition others' behavior, and make it less offensive, or more beneficial. Laws are explicitly aimed at this. A problem then arises regarding how individual action should be regulated. Is it better to impose a behavior that is regarded as beneficial by most members of a community, or ban a behavior that is considered harmful? When, on the other hand, should it be preferred not to intervene at all, and let individuals behave as they like? These questions motivate the first part of the paper, where a normative analysis of three different forms of policies -no intervention, bans and prescriptions -imposing different constraints on individual behavior is presented. The null option, which we might as well call natural order, or anarchy, means that no constraints at all are imposed. Bans are specific prohibitions of certain acts, which leave individuals free to choose between other alternatives. In the present setting, they recall a liberal approach to regulation. Prescriptions are obligations to follow a specific behavior, and maintain a flavor of socialism.
The remainder of the paper addresses the questions above when people are allowed to vote. Are private incentives such that social welfare is maximized? Or, conversely, are we doomed to implement laws that are even worse than the natural order?
I show that on average prescriptions are the optimal policy only when individual actions have very strong (positive or negative) externalities. Bans are likely to be optimal when the externalities are medium to strong, while anarchy is better when externalities are low to medium. These statements are stochastic because which policy is actually the best, from an utilitarian perspective, depends on the distribution of individual preferences.
However, private incentives are such that a long-lasting consensus for nonintervention or for a ban is very rarely found, and prescriptions are agreed upon instead, even when this is not socially optimal.
The intuition is as follows. Limiting individual freedom always comes at a cost in terms of the utility of the specific individuals being constrained, and thus -ceteris paribus -also in terms of aggregate utility. However, it may also restrict (foster) negative (positive) externalities. The overall effect on social welfare depends on the level of those externalities. For example, if few people are harmed by a specific action the best policy is not to intervene. As the external effects increase, a ban on that action is generally to be preferred as opposed to an obligation to playing some other action because it leaves more options, hence more opportunities to increase the utility level, to the regulated individuals. Only for a high level of externalities prescriptions may become optimal.
1 In this case, if the level of externalities is high enough, it becomes optimal to force individuals to play the action that is preferred by most of the people, irrespective of any other consideration. What is most interesting however is that if individuals are asked to vote for one of all the different policy options and we assume that they vote sincerely, they would always support a prescription. This is true because they are always better off if their preferred choice is established by law: put differently, everyone would prefer to be voted as a dictator.
As the relative minority realizes that a disliked prescription is going to be enacted, incentives for strategic voting arise. Some new majority might coordinate on voting for a different prescription, or a ban. By considering a simple mechanism of probabilistic voting I show that non-intervention or limited intervention can be (strategically) supported only if the number of voters is limited, and only for some specific distribution of preferences in the society. As the size of the population increases, the effect of any individual vote becomes almost negligible and the ability for the relative minority to achieve coordination, e.g. on a ban, decreases. Accordingly, the incentives for strategic voting become more limited, and the outcome converges to the non-strategic one: only prescriptions win support.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes how this work is related to the literature; section 3 describes the model; section 4 provides a normative analysis by comparing bans and prescriptions with respect to a utilitarian view of social welfare; section 5 analyzes what happens with binary electoral competition, i.e. when competing policies are evaluated only pairwise; section 6 shows that when the different policies are jointly evaluated non-strategic voting always leads to the implementation of prescriptions; describes the mechanism of strategic voting considered and shows that even with strategic voting prescriptions remain the most likely outcome; section 7 critically examines some of the assumptions of the model and discusses possible generalizations; section 8 concludes.
The literature
This paper relates to two different strands of the literature: the one on the role of the law, liberalism and institutional design and the one on social choices and voting mechanisms, in particular with respect to the properties of majority voting.
The role of the law
The libertarian tradition has long stressed the virtues of minimal state intervention [Nozick, 1974] . However, its argument relies mainly on a philosophical approach: liberty is good for its own sake, and individual freedom, but for a few limitations, is considered inalienable. Freedom is a natural right, deriving ultimately either from some self-evident human trait or directly from God; it is never to be intended as a creation of human societies or a grant of governments. As such it cannot be traded for some other value or evaluated with respect to a somehow defined concept of social welfare.
Social contract theorists such as Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau all believed in a natural law and in natural rights. In this view the role of the state, to which specific monopoly powers are consensually transferred, is only to protect individuals from each other through the legitimate use of physical force.
Austrian economists have also stressed the virtues of minimal (or no) state intervention but the conclusion comes from the science of what means are capable of generating desired ends, rather than from an ethic that liberty is good for its own sake [Mises, 1949 , Hayek, 1960 .
Followers of these traditions share a concept of negative liberty [Berlin, 1958] , which refers to an individual's freedom from being subjected to the authority of others. In the terms of the model proposed here, this view inclines one to either support no government intervention at all, or negative obligations as expressed by bans on specific harmful actions.
On the contrary, supporters of positive liberty, interpreted as the freedom to achieve certain ends, might accept that the state has to force some behaviors upon people in order to ensure the achievement of those ends. Hence they would not object in principle to policies contemplating positive obligations, such as the prescriptions considered in the model.
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The positive and negative approach to social norms have a parallel with a positive and negative approach to moral norms, as exemplified by the two 2 An echo of the distinction between a positive and a negative view of liberty can be found in the distinction between a process aspect and an opportunity aspect of liberty [Sen, 1999] . golden rules of Judaism ("don't do others what you don't like them do unto you") and Christianity ("do others what you would like them do unto you").
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This paper creates a bridge between this philosophical approach and the political economy literature, providing a utilitarian argument in favor of a more liberal state. However, it also raises some doubts that such a liberal state might be agreed upon by means of a democratic voting process, and indeed helps to explain why excessive regulation is often complained.
The paper is also related to the new institutional economics (NIE) literature [Williamson, 2000] , which has specifically focused on the analytical investigation of different institutional frameworks. However, the main concern of NIE has been the definition and enforcement of property rights, mainly at what Williamson calls level 3, i.e. the level of governance.
The present paper adds to this literature by stressing the importance of analyzing different forms of legislative action. Specific institutional arrangements at level 2, the level at which both constitutions and general laws define the rules of the game, might prove effective in binding further legislative choices, thus allowing better types of laws to be implemented at lower tiers. 
Voting mechanisms
Sen's impossibility theorem [Sen, 1970] proves that it is not possible to have a social decision function that satisfies liberalism and Pareto optimality at the same time.
5 Sen's approach is axiomatic. Instead, I look at the private incentives to vote, without imposing any requirement on the outcome. What I show is that, unless they are specifically safeguarded by some higher order law such as a constitution, liberal values are at risk of being sacrificed for individual self-interest, empowered by the dictatorship of the majority. The democratic process produces a result that is Pareto optimal (any change in the law would harm someone) but it is not liberal and, in many cases, not efficient from a utilitarian perspective.
Other unpleasant properties of majority ruling were already recognized in the 18th century by the Marquis of Condorcet [Condorcet, 1785] , who stressed 3 The implications of these two norms for social welfare have been investigated in [Richiardi, 2006] , in a model that is a particular case of the one presented here.
4 From a political economy perspective [Persson and Tab ellini, 2003 ] investigate the empirical evidence of the economic effects of constitutions. Here I do not consider the economic incentives different policies might induce, and look only at individual preferences over those policies.
5 Liberalism is interpreted as allowing each individual to be decisive over at least some alternatives. The condition of unrestricted domain is also imposed.
the problem of finding a stable outcome under majority rule by showing how pairwise voting (binary agenda) on policy alternatives may fail to produce an overall winner.
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Ways out of the Condorcet paradox involve restricting preferences 7 , dispensing with the so-called open agenda assumption 8 or dropping the assumption of pairwise comparison.
However, both agenda manipulation and non-pairwise policy evaluation provide strong incentives for strategic voting, i.e. non-sincere preference revelation. Indeed, [Gibbard, 1973] and [Satterthwaite, 1975] show that any democratic decision-making mechanism involving more than two options, including the majority rule, provides incentives for strategic voting.
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Strategic voting poses a problem because it might lead to different outcomes depending on how individual behavior is modeled, and in particular on the specific assumptions about how expectations are formed.
A widely used approach to deal with strategic voting in the political economy literature is to consider probabilistic voting [Hinich, 1977] , [Coughlin and Nitzan, 1981] , [Ledyard, 1981] , [Ledyard, 1984] . Probabilistic models assume that individuals assign probabilities to the voting behavior of other people. For instance, they may assume that voters in the current election will vote as they did in the previous election, plus some noise. In this case, it has been show, under some reasonable assumptions about ths noise, that voters will vote for their preferred option among the two that got the highest vote share in the previous electoral round (see [Cox, 1997] ).
Note that this strategy requires to take the previous results as given. In the first electoral competition, if the voters have no priors about the preferences of others, they will vote sincerely.
10 In my framework, this implies that they would initially vote for a prescription. Hence, only prescriptions will be voted 6 The Condorcet paradox is an exemplification of the famous Arrow's impossibility theorem [Arrow, 1950] , and more generally of the difficulties in formulating social preferences from a narrow informational base, which rules out interpersonal comparisons.
7 see [Black, 1948] , [Gans and Smart, 1996] and [Rothstein, 1990] for one-dimensional policies; [Grandmont, 1978] , [Plott, 1967] , [Davis et al., 1972] and for the multi-dimensional case 8 for instance by imposing a limited number of pairwise votes 9 The two theorems state that any voting method which is completely strategy-free must be either dictatorial or non-deterministic. Non-determinism is exemplified by the random ballot voting method, which assigns the outcome after looking at a single vote randomly selected. The random ballot method may of course result in different choices being selected if applied multiple times to the same set of ballots.
10 Of course, voters could rely on opinion polls on other information to form their expectations. A model which assumes that voters can observe a private signal about the popularity of competing candidates is [Myatt, 2007] .
for also in subsequent rounds, except for the effect of the noise.
In this paper I consider I slightly more general strategy, where individuals do not restrict their choice set to the two more voted options 11 . I assume that voters weight the payoffs they get from each policy according to the probability of that policy being enacted, and they estimate this probability adaptively by looking at the share of the vote that the same policy has attracted in the last competition. They finally vote for the option to which they have attached the highest expected payoff. The implications of such a mechanism, which similarly to [Myatt, 2007] is able to account for the fact that the trailing challenger suffers only incomplete strategic desertion, are investigated by means of an agent-based simulation model [Tesfatsion, 2006] .
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The reason for adopting this voting mechanism is to allow for more variation in the voting behavior, give more chances to the null option and to bans and ultimately test the robustness of the main result of the paper, i.e. the likely implementation of prescriptions.
The assumption of repeated interaction is of course inadequate for many real situations 13 . However, it makes sense here because I'm only interested in the equilibrium outcome. Out-of-equilibrium electoral rounds should then be thought of as an "as if" modeling device to account for individual learning. Moreover, it should be remembered that I do not intend to present a new theory of strategic voting here, but rather a simple mechanism to test whether the implications of my model are robust to strategic behavior. or a different action.
14 Restricting our attention to three options at a time is a reasonable simplification, which -as it will be shown below -preserves most of the interesting dynamics inherent in the social choice.
In a model with just two alternatives there would be no difference between banning one option and imposing the other. On the other hand, in a model with more than three options additional policies become possible, like banning more than one alternative or restricting individual choice among a small subset of alternatives. These policies however look like they are a half-way between a pure negative (forbidding one and only one action) and a pure positive (imposing one and only one action) obligation. It can therefore be expected that their properties would be a mixture between the properties of pure negative and pure positive obligations, which are analyzed below.
The three actions are labeled A, B and C. The distribution P of individual preferences over these actions can be summarized by the 6-tuple {p 1 , · · · , p 6 }, each number representing the fraction of the population sharing the same combination of the most preferred and the least preferred action (table 1) .
Table 1: Distribution of preferences Individual utility is affected by own actions and by the actions played by whoever the individual is interacting with. Own actions affect n ∈ [0, N ] other people, randomly drawn from a population of size N .
Both individual utility and aggregate welfare are defined only in terms of the expected (individual or total) payoff from one random interaction, π.
Individuals get a payoff of α when they play what they like and a payoff of −α when they are forced to play what they don't like. They get 0 when they play their second choice. Moreover, they cause a payoff of β to each passive opponent should he or she approve of what they have done, and a payoff of −β should he or she disapprove. They cause a payoff of 0 if the opponent ranks the action as his or her second choice.
Individual preferences are private information, and communication before interaction is not possible. This excludes the possibility of contracting outà la Coase [Coase, 1960 ] the externality problem.
There is no political intermediation. Individuals can ask for a vote on any combination of competing policy options, which include both prescriptions and proscriptions. If no majority is reached, no obligation is passed. People are allowed to vote strategically, i.e. they do take into consideration that their best option might be out of reach and give support to some least preferred policy. Incentives to break the law are not considered (one can suppose the cost of punishment is high enough to discourage it).
Examples of applications
As a an example of a practical application of the model, consider the case of city color plans or, more in general, zoning laws. Specific restrictions on house colors or development types (residential, business or commercial buildings, parks, etc.) are often imposed in many urban areas. These restrictions might obviously involve either prescriptions ("all buildings should be painted white") or proscriptions ("buildings should not be taller than 5 floors").
A second example is dressing code. France for instance passed a law in 2004 forbidding people in public office and scholars to show off religious signs (such as the Muslim veil, the Jewish kippah, etc.). The ban, which was promoted to foster integration and fight integralism, has prompted a wide debate and fierce opposition, inside and outside France, precisely on the grounds of being illiberal. However, stronger prescriptions, like wearing school uniforms, are usual in many countries (as in British schools).
A third example is use of public space. For instance, in a park there can be bans on specific activities, such as having barbecues, or playing music; some areas could be dedicated to particular activities like playing football (a few lines on the ground and two nets generally taking the place of an official prescription); other places might be subject to no restrictions whatsoever. Note again that if there are just two alternatives (like walking on the grass or on the pathways), there is no difference between imposing one option or banning the other.
One more example is rape-induced pregnancies. Suppose the alternatives are (i) abort, (ii) leave the child for adoption and (iii) keep the child. Any decision is likely to affect not only those who take it, but also other people (who might disregard it on moral grounds, or like it as a signal that the option is truly available), and who in turn might try to exert an influence on the choice. Interaction here is in principle global, the notice of the action being enough to cause a reaction.
Finally, note that α = 0 15 implies individuals either don't have or cannot predict any consequence from their actions toward their own utility. As an example, consider the case of you finding out that your best friend's girlfriend is having a relationship with some other guy. What should you do? You can either tell your friend, or speak with his girlfriend, perhaps speak with the other guy, or say nothing (which is by the way different from not interacting at all). In either case the well being of your friend is going to be affected (β > 0). What's more, you will probably not know how your friend would like you to behave: asking him is the equivalent to telling him the truth.
Social welfare
Purely altruistic individuals with α = 0 would choose their action by considering some prior about the distribution of types P . On the other hand, selfish individuals with α > 0 would always play their preferred action, if possible. If this is not allowed, they would choose their second best option, and only if forced to would they play their least preferred action.
The individual expected payoffs under different policies are reported in the Appendix. The corresponding expressions for social welfare are simply obtained by multiplying the expected payoffs for each individual type by the relative frequency of that type, and then summing up.
Under the null policy, the expected social welfare associated with the action of one random individual in the population is:
To see why, consider the case of a type 1 or type 2 individual (they both love A). Without restrictions they will always play A, and get α for themselves. In addition, they will cause a payoff of β in (p 1 + p 2 )n individuals, and a payoff of −β in (p 3 +p 5 )n individuals. Note that the probability of choosing randomly a type 1 or type 2 individual is (p 1 + p 2 ). The expected outcomes for the case when B or C are played account for the remaining terms.
Second, let's suppose a prescription is imposed. To fix ideas, consider the case when A is law. The expected payoff for an active player with unknown preferences will be π A,active = (p 1 + p 2 − p 3 − p 5 )α, while he or she will cause an expected payoff π A,passive = (p 1 + p 2 − p 3 − p 5 )βfor any of the n passive players he or she is interacting with. Hence:
The expressions for the case when B or C becomes compulsory easily follow. Third, let's consider the case of a ban. To fix ideas, focus on the case when C is forbidden. The corresponding expression for social welfare is:
All individuals except those who like C are able to do what they prefer: this accounts for the first term. Those who play A (type 1 and 2 plus type 6, who have to play their second choice) cause positive externalities for type 1 and type 2 individuals, and negative externalities for type 3 and type 5 individuals (second term). Those who play B (type 3 and 4 plus type 5, who have to play their second choice) cause positive externalities for type 3 and type 4 individuals, and negative externalities for type 1 and type 6 individuals (third term). The expressions for the case when A or B become outlawed involve but straightforward modifications.
Comparing 6 different policies (3 prescriptions, 3 bans) plus the null for any possible distribution of individual preferences and any combination of α, βand n proves to be a tedious task analytically. Instead, I have normalized α to 1 and simulated the outcomes by letting each p t , t = 1, . . . , 6 and βn change by increasing steps of .05 in the range [0, 1], given the constraint i p i = 1. This leads to the evaluation of 5,440,115 different cases. For each of these combinations, social welfare under each of the seven policies, as given by equations 1-3, is computed. Then, for each policy type (null, bans, prescriptions) the frequency of cases in which a policy of that type is optimal is reported. The results are summarized in figure 1.
Supposing no priors about the distribution of preferences in the population, from a social point of view it is better not to impose any restriction whatsoever on individual behavior if the overall level of externalities (the externality produced by an action, multiplied by the number of people affected) are not too high (βn < 2.25α). Bans are the most likely optimal policy if the overall level of externalities is between 2.25 and 3.25 times the level of internal (self-generated) utility, and prescriptions are the most likely optimal policy if the overall level of externalities is above 3.25 times the level of internal utility.
Figure 1: Best policies. Each point is the probability, for an unknown underlying preference configuration, that a specific policy is socially optimal. The probabilities may sum to less than 1 because for specific preference configurations different policy types may lead to the same level of social welfare. No winner is assigned in this case.
Discussion
The analysis of the previous paragraph suggests the need to look at a measure of total externalities, βn. Other things being equal, increasing the number of persons affected by the action would thus increase the likelihood that it is socially optimal to intervene.
In the abortion example passive players might well be numerous; however, β is likely to be very small with respect to α. In the case of zoning laws α is probably smaller but the number of people n affected by the action is also smaller.
Prescriptions are optimal only when a large number of people love a given action, but there is still a minority that would otherwise choose some other action, and the (negative) externalities from this minority are relevant. For instance, if βn = α = 1 and the type distribution is p 1 = .55; p 2 = .25; p 3 = 0; p 4 = .1; p 5 = 0; p 6 = .1 prescribing A becomes optimal: 80% of the population loves A, however the remaining 20% of people would choose actions that the majority dislikes. However, in this case the gain over the null policy is quite limited (+2.56%), and the gain over imposing a ban on B (which is disliked by 65% of the population) even more so (only +0.31%).
To see this in more general terms, it is convenient to represent the distribution of preferences in the society as a single point in a three dimensional space, where the axes are labeled a, b and c. The a coordinate is found by counting all individuals who love A, and subtracting all individuals who hate A. The result is then normalized to the size of the population. Similarly for the other two coordinates.
16 Hence,
and a + b + c = 0. Note that different distributions of preferences can lead to the same point in the space. For instance, the point on the origin is given not only by
, but by any combination of preferences such that p 1 = p 3 ; p 2 = p 5 ; p 4 = p 6 . We can now define the extent to which preferences are homogeneous, as the distance from the center of the sphere:
all points lie inside a sphere around the origin. In the center of the sphere preferences are more heterogeneous; on the surface they are more homogeneous. Figure 2 shows that (i) for a given level of the externalities, the higher the level of homogeneity d in the population the higher the likelihood that it is optimal to intervene with a more coercive policy (first bans, then prescriptions), and (ii) the higher the level of externalities the lower the level of homogeneity when it is likely to become optimal to intervene.
Binary agenda
When comparing only two policy options strategic voting is not an issue, and rational individuals will always support the alternative that brings them higher utility, as reported in the Appendix. However, due to the multi-dimensional character of the model pairwise comparison of policy alternatives (binary 
Prescriptions
Figure 2: Probability, averaged over preference configurations that lead to the same distance measure d, that a ban (top panel) or a prescription (bottom panel) is optimal, for three different values of βn. The spikes are due to the fact that, given the specific grid chosen for exploring the space of possible preference distributions, some values of d can be produced by more combinations, while others by less combinations, and some others cannot be produced at all. By thickening the grid, smoother figures are obtained. agenda) leads to policy cycles: for any given policy, an alternative can generally be found that will get majority support. Thus, a majority will ask for a referendum on the alternative, and will win it.
A typical policy transition matrix is reported in table 2, where each cell (i, j) contains the share of the voters supporting policy j against policy i. A switch to the new policy takes place whenever the value of the corresponding cell is above .5 (bold values). In the example, A will never be implemented; the null and No A policies are on the other hand quite likely, since they can be defeated only by No A and B, respectively.
Note that if policy i is defeated against policy j it cannot be the case that in a subsequent vote the outcome is reversed: the sum of any two symmetric cells must be 1.
Replacement of bans with obligations
It is interesting to note that a majority can always be found to replace a specific ban with an appropriate prescription, but the reverse is not necessarily true.
To see this suppose without loss of generality a ban on playing C is in place. A straightforward comparison of the individual payoffs under the different policies reported in the Appendix shows that types 1, 2 and 6 will be in favor of replacing it with an obligation to play A, while types 3, 4 and 5 would oppose the change. Thus, if p 1 + p 2 + p 6 > p 3 + p 4 + p 5 the ban is replaced with an obligation to play A. However, if this is not the case and p 1 +p 2 +p 6 < p 3 +p 4 +p 5 , a new absolute majority is found to replace the ban with an obligation to play B. Note that this is true irrespective of the values of α, β and n.
17 Hence, in pairwise comparisons an appropriate prescription can always be found to replace a specific ban. Now, suppose again without loss of generality that a prescription to play A is in place. By comparing the different individual incentives reported in the Appendix we observe that: support will be found to switch to No B if p 3 + p 5 + p 6 > .5; support will be found to switch to No C if p 3 + p 4 + p 5 > .5; when A is confronted with No A, type 1 and 2 individuals will oppose the change, while type 3 and 5 will support it; type 4 will be in favor only if α + βn(−p 1 + p 2 + p 3 + p 4 − p 5 − p 6 ) > 0, and type 6 will be in favor only if α + βn(
Numerical evaluation of all possible preference combinations obtained again by allowing each p t change by increasing steps of .05 in [0, 1], and βn change by increasing steps of .05 in [0, 2] shows a change to a ban will happen only in 64.47% of the cases. In other words, in pairwise comparisons it is not always true that an appropriate ban can be found to replace a specific prescription.
Full agenda
Let's now turn to the case when all policy options are jointly evaluated (full agenda). Individuals are asked to vote for the policy they prefer: if no majority for any ban or prescription is found, the null policy remains in place. It is trivial to see that the best (non-strategic) choice is to support an obligation prescribing to do one's own most preferred action. Thus, if max(p 1 + p 2 , p 3 + p 4 , p 5 + p 6 ) < .5 no policy is implemented; alternatively, a prescription is put in place (see table 3). Table 3 : Support for prescriptions, full agenda 17 Of course for some preference distributions a prescription to play C might also be preferred to the ban.
Policy Supported by
As already discussed, enlarging the set of possible alternatives provides incentives for strategic voting. Within the framework of the present model, a non trivial question is whether such a behavior leads to increased support for bans or the null policy.
To investigate this issue I adopt the following mechanism of strategic voting: individuals vote for the option that brings them higher expected payoffs; they compute these expected payoffs by discounting the payoffs they get under each policy by the probability of that policy being enacted; they hold adaptive expectations on this probability based on the results of the last vote. In addition, to allow for more strategy exploration, each voter is assumed to vote randomly with probability r.
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As I will show, this simple mechanism has some pleasant properties. First of all, the number of non-sincere voters decreases with the size of the population, and the outcome correspondingly approaches the result under nonstrategic voting. Moreover, as the size of the population increases strategic voting is increasingly targeted at supporting the second most popular policy option. That is, as individuals realize it is more and more difficult to affect the outcome of the vote, some stop playing strategically and turn back to sincere preference revelation, while some others join their efforts and focus their support on the most likely alternative.
The implications of this voting strategy are analyzed by means of an agentbased simulation.
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The schedule of the simulation is reported in figure 3 . The number of agents, N, is set to 100. The experimentation probability r is set to .1.
The first thing to note is that this voting strategy does not lead to policy cycles. Some distribution of preferences may lead to very close races, and due to the fraction of random voters policy switches are indeed observed; however, as soon as randomness is removed stability is obtained.
Convergence, i.e. stationarity of the vote shares, is immediately achieved if the population size is bigger than a handful of agents. Even with N < 10 players convergence generally takes place within 300 periods. To allow for such situations, in the analysis that follows each simulation run lasts for 500 periods (500 election rounds), and only the outcome of the last election is 18 Varying this parameter however only affects the speed of convergence and the stability of the stationary state, a higher speed (a higher value of r) leading to a more perturbed outcome.
19 The simulation is written in Java and makes use of JAS simulation platform [Sonnessa, 2004] .
The code can be downloaded from http://utenti.dea.univpm.it/richiardi/code/Bans.rar or requested to the author. Hence, according to the results of section 4 we are in a region where the socially optimal policy, given that the individual preferences are unknown, is anarchy. For the sake of brevity only outcomes for values of βn ∈ {.2, 1} are reported. Table 4 shows that the number of strategic voters in the population decreases as the population size increases, to reach a floor of about 45%, irrespective of the values of β and n. However, among those who vote strategically, the share of votes in favor of a minority policy option increases. This is also shown in table 5, where the fraction of strategic voters supporting each policy (ranked from the most to the least voted) is reported. As N increases and the winning policy becomes less and less influenced by strategic voting, those individuals who still find it attractive to play strategically do it in order to affect the choice of the most relevant alternative.
Note that these two characteristics of the specific probabilistic voting mechanism used in this paper could not easily be predicted knowing only the individual voting rule 20 . Finally, Table 4 : Fraction of strategic voters in the population to more than 30 individuals, and prescriptions are always voted. As expected, higher values of the externality parameter βand of the number of affected people n lead to a higher frequency of the implementation of prescriptions even when the population size is (very) small.
Discussion
I have shown that when all policy options are jointly considered non-strategic behavior always leads to some prescription being selected. Strategic behavior could in principle change this outcome; however, except for when decisions involve only a small number of agents, this never happens. Of course, bargaining might totally internalize the externality problem and allow a recovery of the socially efficient outcome, but the possibility of agreeing on side payments for voting decisions are limited, if not explicitly prohibited by the law. .05 512 Table 5 : Fraction of strategic voters supporting policy ranked 1 ... 4. Policy ranked 1 is the winner. Data on policies ranked 5 to 7 are not reported because the supporting fraction is very small.
The fact that individuals are not able to coordinate on a socially better outcome reflects a sort of "race to the bottom" in the voting process: as individuals understand that others might coordinate on voting for an obligation that is odious to them, they react by voting another (less odious) obligation.
Extensions
The structure of the payoffs considered in the model can be better evaluated after discussing some simplifying assumptions, and what would happen should they be relaxed.
Consider the general payoff matrix for a a three-choice model of .00 1.00 512 Table 6 : Strategic outcomes simplifying assumptions: (1) β a = kα a for all actions a, (2) α 3 = −α 1 , and (3) α i =α j for all individuals i and j, i = j. Dispensing from assumption (1) would allow us to explicitly model a taste for diversity, i.e. the case when agents' most preferred actions do not coincide with what they would wish others to do (the rank in terms of the αs might differ from that of the βs). However, such a taste for diversity can still be be accounted for in the simplified setting analyzed in this paper, as actions can be appropriately redefined. For instance, in the color plan example discussed above, one of the available options could be defined as "Paint your house a different color than that of your neighbor's". The additional normalization α 2 = 0 is innocuous.
Assumption (2), the symmetry of the payoffs, poses no problems when looking at which action is played or voted for, since only the ranking is relevant in this case. On the other hand, it does affect which policy ranking is derived from social welfare considerations. Table 7 : General payoff matrix. Internal payoff refers to the utility individual i gets when he or she plays action a. External payoff refers to the externality individual i receives when another individual plays action a.
As for what concerns assumption (3), the hypothesis that α and β are homogeneous in the population can be easily relaxed, provided that we are willing to assume that the individual α i and β i are uncorrelated with the individual types. Considering heterogeneity in α and β in this case only implies that we need to replace α and β with their average valueᾱ andβ in eqs. 1-3, and β alone with its average valueβ in eqs. 6-12.
Moreover, under the plausible assumption that β i = kα i (whoever has a bigger α has also a bigger β, and vice versa) heterogeneity changes neither actions nor votes, since they are not based on interpersonal comparisons.
Conclusions
In this paper I have developed a simple model of social interaction, where individual actions have (positive or negative) externalities on the well being of others, and individuals are allowed to vote by majority ruling for a ban or a prescription. Assuming no compensations among individuals are contractable, the social optimum is to place no restrictions on individual behavior if the total externalities are low enough, and impose a ban on some specific action if the total externalities are higher. Prescriptions are optimal only when a large number of people has a preference over a given action, but there is still a minority that would otherwise choose some different action, and the (negative) externalities from this minority are relevant.
I then turned to private incentives to vote. In pairwise competition policy cycles naturally arise, but if individuals have to choose from the whole set of possible bans and prescriptions, the latter always prevail under sincere voting. Except for the case when voting involves only a limited number (< 30) of agents this result is also robust to strategic voting.
Thus, the answers to the questions in the title are: yes, we would be better off in restricting the number of prescriptions that force individual behavior in favor of more bans, which clearly identify harmful actions; however no, it is unlikely that this could be achieved by majority ruling, given that selfinterested voters will tend to support positive obligations. Put differently and more provocatively, a liberal state cannot be directly and liberally enforced. This result stresses the importance of constitutions as a way to provide efficient frameworks for policy discussion.
A Individual payoffs for different policy options
In the following, expected payoffs from a cycle of random interactions where all individuals play once are reported, for all different types of individuals and under each policy. Types are indexed as in table 1. Thus, each individual plays once as the active player, and on average n times as a passive player.
I assume that, at any moment in time, all agents are equally likely to act. Hence, the expected payoffs from just one random interaction, where an individual of type t has a probability 1/N of being the active player and a probability n/N of being the passive player is just π t =Π t /N . A.5 Ban on A Π 1 = 0 + βn(−p 2 − p 3 − p 4 ) Π 2 = 0 + βn(−p 1 − p 5 − p 6 ) Π 3 = α + βn(p 2 + p 3 + p 4 ) Π 4 = α + βn(−p 1 + p 2 + p 3 + p 4 − p 5 − p 6 ) Π 5 = α + βn(p 1 + p 5 + p 6 ) Π 6 = α + βn(p 1 − p 2 − p 3 − p 4 + p 5 + p 6 ) (10)
A.6 Ban on B Π 1 = α + βn(p 1 + p 2 + p 4 ) Π 2 = α + βn(p 1 + p 2 − p 3 + p 4 − p 5 − p 6 ) Π 3 = 0 + βn(−p 1 − p 2 − p 4 ) Π 4 = 0 + βn(−p 3 − p 5 − p 6 ) Π 5 = α + βn(−p 1 − p 2 + p 3 − p 4 + p 5 + p 6 ) Π 6 = α + βn(p 3 + p 5 + p 6 ) (11) A.7 Ban on C Π 1 =α+βn(p 1 + p 2 − p 3 − p 4 − p 5 + p 6 ) Π 2 =α+βn(p 1 + p 2 + p 6 ) Π 3 =α+βn(−p 1 − p 2 + p 3 + p 4 + p 5 − p 6 ) Π 4 =α+βn(p 3 + p 4 + p 5 ) Π 5 = 0 +βn(−p 1 − p 2 − p 6 ) Π 6 = 0 +βn(−p 3 − p 4 − p 5 ) (12)
